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The Market in Unmatured Tort
Claims: Twenty-Five Years Later
Stephen Marks*
I.

Introduction

In an article in 1989 in the Virginia Law Review, Professor
Robert Cooter argued for changes in the law that would
facilitate the development of a market in unmatured tort
claims.1 An unmatured tort claim is a potential claim that a
potential victim has before any injury has occurred.2 Cooter
proposed that potential victims have the right to sell their
unmatured tort claims.3 That is, Cooter proposed that potential
victims be allowed to sell their right to sue even before an
accident or injury ever occurs.4 Even twenty-five years later,
the proposal remains both bold and imaginative, and yet it
remains unadopted in any jurisdiction. There is a reason for
this. In this Article, I reexamine the proposal as to its likely
intended and unintended effects. The unintended effects were
overlooked in the original article because of its static analysis.
A dynamic analysis reveals these unintended effects. These
effects do not invalidate the proposal. I conclude that Cooter’s
proposal continues to have merit, but several modifications are
necessary if the proposal is to succeed. Without these
modifications, the proposal will fail to accomplish its goals and
will have serious adverse unintended effects. In short, this
Article argues for the adoption of measures to permit the
development of a limited market in unmatured tort claims. The
primary limitation is the exclusion of potential injurers in the
market for their own unmatured tort claims. Other

* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
1. See Robert Cooter, Towards A Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75
VA. L. REV. 383 (1989).
2. See id. at 383.
3. See id.
4. See id.
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modifications include utilizing a different measure of damages
and a prohibition on liability limiting agreements.
II. Background and Organization
In this Article we will use the following terms:
Unmatured Tort Claim: As indicated above, an unmatured
tort claim is a claim that is based on possible future accidents.5
Market for Unmatured Tort Claims: This market would
permit potential victims to sell their potential right to sue to
others. The buyer of the unmatured tort claim would be able to
sue the tortfeasor if and when an injury occurred to the victim
whose tort claim the buyer has purchased.6 If an injury occurs,
a court may award damages. The amount of damages may be
measured according to one of the following:
Full-Compensation Damages: The amount of damages that
will give the victim the same amount of utility whether or not
the injury occurs.7
Optimal-Insurance Damages: The amount of damages that
will give the victim the maximum expected utility over injury
and no-injury states given the probability of injury.8
Optimal-Deterrence Damages: The amount of damages that
will induce the potential injurer to adopt the optimal level of
care, where the optimal level of care is that which produces the
maximum amount of expected utility over injury and no-injury
states. (Again, this expected utility is just the product of the
probability of no accident and the utility if there is no injury
plus product of the probability of an injury and the utility if
there is an injury.)9
Optimal-insurance damages may be lower than fullcompensation damages.10 This is the primary motivating factor
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 394 (defining “ideal insurance”).
8. See id. at 396 (comparing “ideal insurance” with “ideal
compensation”). This expected utility is just the product of the probability of
no injury and the utility if there is no injury plus the product of the
probability of an injury and the utility if there is an injury.
9. See id. at 398-400.
10. An early and influential article in this area is Philip J. Cook &
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in Cooter’s proposal for a market in unmatured tort claims. By
allowing potential victims to sell their claims to full
compensation, they can purchase optimal insurance.11
Meanwhile, potential tortfeasors will be deterred since holders
of the claims will be able to sue for full compensation.12 The
result, according to Cooter’s analysis, would be both optimal
deterrence and optimal insurance. There would be additional
advantages to such a market. Since, under Cooter’s proposal,
potential tortfeasors could purchase the unmatured tort claims
of their potential victims, transaction costs of negotiation and
suit would be reduced since such potential tortfeasors would
not sue themselves.13 Also, socially optimal institutional
arrangements would develop naturally through the market
rather than be determined through the political process. For
example, drivers could sell their rights to their insurer. The
insurer could then waive these claims in an agreement with
other insurers.14 The result would be a system of no-fault
insurance.15
Given the potential advantages of a market for unmatured
tort claims, it is important to examine whether such a market
will develop and the possible consequences if it does not. I show
in this Article that the inclusion of potential tortfeasors in the
market will effectively kill the market. Furthermore, incentives
for optimal care by potential tortfeasors will disappear if
potential tortfeasors are allowed to purchase the claims of their
potential victims. These results are driven by moral hazard.
That is, potential tortfeasors will act differently with and
without the rights. Cooter suggests that the market will
eliminate the moral hazard problem and thus the incentives for
potential tortfeasors to adopt optimal care will remain intact.16
I show that rather than the market eliminating the moral
Daniel A Graham, The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of
Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 Q. J. ECON. 143, 151 (1977) (showing that full
compensation generally over-insures and over-deters).
11. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 384.
12. See id. at 387 (assuming that full compensation is optimal for
deterrence).
13. See id. at 407.
14. See id. at 385.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 393.
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hazard problem, the moral hazard problem will kill the market
unless potential tortfeasors are excluded. This effect becomes
apparent when one introduces a time element into the analysis.
It is true that excluding potential tortfeasors from the
market may eliminate some of the transaction cost savings that
could be realized if potential tortfeasors can buy the rights of
their potential victims, given that in that case potential
torfeasors would not sue themselves. Still, there may remain
other significant transaction costs savings. For example, thirdparty insurers could buy the claims and then agree not to sue
each other. Furthermore, other advantages remain. Primary
among these is the ability to have optimal deterrence and
optimal insurance.
Here is how the rest of the Article is organized:
Section III provides an example that demonstrates the
relationship among full compensation, optimal insurance, and
optimal deterrence. Full compensation may both over-insure
and over-deter. Therefore, Cooter’s proposal must be modified
so that unmatured tort claims give a right to optimaldeterrence damages rather than to full-compensation damages.
Because the optimal deterrence and optimal insurance
measures of damages differ, the market for unmatured tort
claims still may function to provide optimal deterrence and
optimal insurance as Cooter suggests.
Section IV demonstrates how inclusion of potential
tortfeasors in the market for unmatured tort claims will
effectively kill that market and lead to suboptimal precaution.
Thus, potential tortfeasors must be excluded in order for the
market to develop and to accomplish its purpose.
Section V demonstrates that agreements between potential
tortfeasors and the holders of unmatured claims could lead to
suboptimal results. Effectively, allowing such agreements
would allow potential tortfeasors to accomplish indirectly, that
which they could not accomplish directly under the above
modifications. Thus, the proposal must be modified to prohibit
liability-limiting agreements.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/5
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III. Full Compensation, Optimal Deterrence, and Optimal
Insurance
In what follows, we define and examine three measures of
damages: full-compensation damages, optimal-insurance
damages, and optimal-deterrence damages. Let us start by
considering a product that can cause injury. Suppose for now
that the potential tortfeasor, a manufacturer, will pay to the
victim compensation if the product injures the victim. Both the
cost of production and expected damages will be reflected in the
price of the product. The product gives the victim a certain
amount of utility that depends on price and on whether the
victim gets injured.
A numerical example will demonstrate the principles. We
begin by assuming that the potential victim (let us call this
person K) is risk averse (has diminishing marginal utility of
wealth)17 and has the expected utilities of wealth given in
Table 1.
Table 1

Wealth
($)
850

Utility with
no Product
(utils)
145

Utility with
Product and
no Injury
(utils)
165

Utility with
Product and
Injury
(utils)
-450

860

150

170

-440

870

154

174

-432

880

157

177

-426

890

159

179

-422`

900

160

180

-420

.
.
1000
.
.
3870
.
.
5850

.
.
164
.
.
.
.
.
215

.
.
184
.
.
.
.
.
235

.
.
-402
.
.
-26
.
.
165

17. 861-1st TAX MGMT. (BNA) ESTATES, GIFTS, & TRUSTS, at A-3 (2013).
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Now suppose that K begins with a wealth of $1000 and
suppose (for now) that there is a no-liability rule (the consumer
bears all of the risk) and that the risk of injury is 1%. Suppose
that the product costs $100 to purchase. Under these facts, K
will purchase the product. Purchasing the product will
decrease the consumer’s wealth by $100, from $1000 to $900,
but total utility will increase from 164 to 174. (See Table 2.)
Table 2
Expected Utilities with No Compensation

Do not
purchase
Product

Purchase
Product

Prob

Initial
Wealth

less
Amt
Spent
on
Product

Wealth
After
Purchase

Utility

Total
Expected
Utility

No
Injury

1.0

$1000

0

$1000

164

164

No
Injury

.99

$1000

$100

$900

180
17418

Injury

.01

$1000

$100

$900

-420

A. Full Compensation and Optimal Insurance
Full compensation makes the victim whole, that is, gives
the victim the same utility whether or not the accident occurs.
In our example, full compensation is $5000. To see this, assume
that if K is injured, then K receives $5000. As such, potential
injurers (such as the manufacturers of products) must pay
$5000 with a probability of 1%. This is an expected cost of $50

18. This is (180 x .99) + (-420 x .01) = 174.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/5
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that is passed on to consumers, that is, to K. Thus the price of
the product will increase to $150 so that, if the product is
purchased and no injury occurs, the consumers’ wealth will be
$850. If an accident occurs, the consumer will receive $5000
and have a total wealth of $5850. In either case, total utility
will be 165, which is what is meant by full compensation. (See
Table 3.)
Table 3
Utilities with Full Compensation
Initial
Wealth

less Amt
Spent on
Product

plus
Damages
Received

Final
Wealth

Total
Utility

No Injury

1000

150

0

850

165

Injury

1000

150

5000

5850

165

Purchase
product

We should note two things: (1) K’s utility is still higher
from purchasing the product than from not purchasing the
product. (Recall that the utility from not purchasing the
product is 164. See Table 2.) However, with slightly different
numbers (suppose the utility of $1000 wealth without the
product were 166), full compensation could lead to the product
not being purchased. (2) The consumer’s utility is lower than in
a regime where there is no liability. (With no liability, the
expected utility was 174. Again, see Table 2.)
Thus, providing full-compensation damages lowers
expected utility as compared to a no-liability rule. This is not to
say that a no-liability rule is optimal. Rather, this
demonstrates that full-compensation insurance does not
necessarily maximize utility. It is possible that some level of
insurance, short of full-compensation insurance, maximizes
utility.
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B. Full Compensation and Optimal Deterrence
That optimal deterrence and full compensation differ is
well known in extreme circumstances.19 Calculations for the
value of a life from risk-taking activity (so-called hedonic
damages) reflect the realization that optimal deterrence
requires a payment that is below full compensation. In the case
of death, full compensation implies an infinite payment. But
this is true of many traumatic injuries. For example, there is
probably no sum of money that would compensate most people
for quadriplegia. Yet there is some finite level of damages that
will induce the potential tortfeasor to adopt the optimal level of
care. Hedonic damages for death and other risk-based
assessments of injuries are attempts to get optimal deterrence,
not full compensation (which is impossible in these cases) or
even optimal insurance.20 For example, hedonic damages for
death are positive and finite even though the victim cannot be
made whole and even if the victim would not have insured
against death. The same is true in less extreme cases.
Let us turn back to our example. So far we have considered
a product whose probability of causing injury is fixed. Suppose,
however, that the producer could take more care and that more
care reduces the probability of injury. Suppose, for example,
that some costly technology exists for reducing the probability
of an accident to zero. Suppose that this technology costs $40.
Suppose again that there is a full compensation rule, which
means that if an accident happens, the manufacturer must pay
$5000 to the victim. A manufacturer then has the choice of
paying $40 to prevent the accident or paying $5000 whenever
the accident occurs. The latter option has an expected cost of
$50, since the probability of an accident without care is 0.1.
Thus, the manufacturer will pay $40 to prevent the accident
and factor the cost into the price of products. This means that
the price of the product will be $140, that K’s wealth after
purchase will be $860, and that the injury will not happen.
19. See Patricia Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in
Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 520-21 (1984).
20. In this sense, hedonic damages are misnamed since 'hedonic' evokes
thoughts of lost pleasure. See Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159, 163 (N.D.
Ill. 1985), rev’d, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/5
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Total utility will be 170. (See Table 4.)
Table 4
Utility with Full Compensation and $40 Cost of Care

Purchase
product
(injury does
not occur)

Initial
Wealth

Amount Spent
on Product

Final Wealth

Total Utility

$1000

$140

$860

170

This is worse than if there are no damages. In the case of
no damages, the potential injurer does not take care, the
consumer purchases the product, and the consumer has an
expected utility of 174. (See Table 2.) Thus, a full compensation
liability rule will cause the manufacturer to buy $40 of
prevention, with a resultant expected utility for the consumer
of 170, while a no liability rule will result in no care with a
resultant expected utility for the consumer of 174. Clearly, a
full-compensation liability rule over-deters.
The notion that full-compensation provides too great a
level of deterrent effect fuels some discussions about tort
reform.21 For example, in the medical profession there is
concern about excessive testing. In the small aircraft industry,
excessive precaution may lead to prices that few can afford.
Even though full compensation can over-deter, this does
not mean that zero compensation is optimal. Suppose that the
level of compensation was set at $3000 rather than $5000. This
would mean that a manufacturer would employ a means of
prevention if it costs less than $30, but would not employ it if it
cost more than $30. (This is because its expected liability
without the means of prevention is $30, that is, a 1% chance of
$3000.) Thus, the manufacturer would not employ a means of
prevention that cost $40. Suppose the means of prevention cost
$20. Then the manufacturer would employ it. The cost would
be reflected in the price of the product and the consumer’s
wealth would be reduced to $880. With a wealth of $880, the
21. See Cook & Graham, supra note 10, at 155.
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consumer has a utility of 177 (see Table 1) which is better than
174.
Table 5
Utility with $3000 Compensation and $20 Cost of Care

Purchase
product
(injury does
not occur)

Initial
Wealth

Amount Spent
on Product

Final Wealth

$1000

$120

$880

Total Utility

177

C. Optimal Deterrence and Optimal Insurance
So we know that full-compensation damages may overdeter and provide too much insurance.22 It also turns out that
optimal-deterrence damages may provide too much insurance.23
To see this, let us suppose that the damages for optimaldeterrence are $3000. Suppose that the only possibility is for
the manufacturer to pay $40 for care that reduces probability
to zero. In such a case the manufacture will not adopt care. The
price of the product will be set at $130, reflecting production
costs and damages. If the consumer purchases the product then
the expected utility will be, in our model, 172 utils. (See Table
6.)

22. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 396.
23. See id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/5
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Table 6
Expected Utility with $3000 Damages

Purchase
Product

Prob

Initial
Wealth

less
Amt
Spent
on
Product

No
Injury

.99

$1000

$130

Injury

.01

Damages

Wealth
After
Purchase
Price
and
Damages

Utility

0

$870

174

Total
Expected
Utility

172
$1000

$130

3000

$3870

-26

One hundred seventy-two utils. is still a worse result than
if there were no damages. The damages in this case do not
optimally insure. (In terms of insurance, no damages is better
than this level of damages.) Yet we want to give the
manufacturer the incentive to adopt care when it is efficient to
do so, because if the cost of care drops, say to $20, then the
consumer is better off with the producer adopting care. (Recall
that with a cost of care at $20, the utility that the consumer
gets is 177.) In general, full-compensation damages will be
greater than or equal to optimal-deterrence damages, and
optimal-deterrence damages will be greater than or equal to
optimal-insurance damages.24
D. The Market for Unmatured Tort Claims
How do we get both optimal deterrence and optimal
insurance? Cooter’s model suggests that the courts grant fullcompensation damages, but that the potential victim be
permitted to sell the right to collect these damages to others.25
These others can then sue the tortfeasor.26 The potential
victims can then buy optimal insurance.27 As we have

24.
25.
26.
27.

See Cook & Graham, supra note 10, at 144.
See Cooter, supra note 1, at 385.
See id.
See id. at 387.
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demonstrated above, full-compensation damages can lead to
over-deterrence. Still, Cooter’s point is well-taken. We can
modify Cooter’s proposal as follows:
Modification 1: Courts should award optimaldeterrence
damages
(rather
than
fullcompensation damages).
Potential victims would be allowed to sell the right to these
damages to others, and they could afford to buy optimal
insurance. This will result in optimal-deterrence and optimal
insurance. However, as will be shown in the following sections,
additional modifications are necessary.
IV. Why the Market Must Exclude Potential Tortfeasors
In Cooter’s proposal, potential tortfeasors would be allowed
to purchase unmatured tort claims from their potential
victims.28 This would give additional advantages by eliminating
significant transaction costs involved in negotiation and
litigation, since tortfeasors would never sue themselves.
In this section, I show that a market for unmatured tort
claims will develop only if potential tortfeasors are prohibited
from purchasing the claims of their potential victims. Potential
tortfeasors who hold unmatured tort claims related to their
own torts, will engage in socially suboptimal behavior due to
moral hazard. Cooter argued that moral hazard will be
corrected by the market.29 I make the opposite argument;
Moral hazard will not be corrected by the market. Rather,
moral hazard will destroy the market.30 If tortfeasors are not
prohibited from buying unmatured tort claims from their
victims, there will be insufficient incentives for optimal
precaution even if courts award optimal-deterrence damages.
The reason to suspect that a secondary market will never
develop is that potential tortfeasors are always in a better
position than other secondary buyers to purchase unmatured
28. See id. at 385.
29. See id. at 393.
30. See Patricia Danzon, supra note 19, at 522-25.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/5
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tort claims due to moral hazard and transaction costs.
Unmatured tort claims are always more valuable to the
tortfeasor than to anyone else. The problem is exacerbated by
other types strategic behavior as well.31 The problem may be
mitigated through compulsory insurance, but it is not solved.32
This is demonstrated below.
A. The Contingency of Behavior
What level of care will a potential tortfeasor adopt? The
answer is: it depends. This answer is so important to the
following discussion that it is useful to take a few moments and
ponder what it means.
An unmatured tort claim represents a right to sue the
tortfeasor for any accident that occurs within a specified time
period.33 Suppose that such a tort claim is sold on January 1,
2015 and that it has a duration of one year. How much care
will be adopted during the 2015 year? It depends on whether
the potential injurer owns the unmatured tort claim or if
someone else does. We can call this the contingent behavior
principle:
Contingent Behavior Principle. The behavior of the
potential injurer is flexible. In particular, the behavior
of the potential injurer can differ depending on who
owns the unmatured tort claim.
The importance of the contingent behavior assumption is
its interaction with value. The value of the above unmatured
tort claim on January 1, 2015, depends on the expected
behavior of the potential injurer in 2015. We can call this the
contingent value principle.
Contingent Value Principle. The value of the
unmatured tort claim depends on the expected behavior
of the potential injurer during the actual period of the
unmatured tort claim.
The two principles together imply that value is contingent
on who owns the tort claim.
31. See Cooter, surpa note 1, at 404
32. See Danzon, supra note 19, at 518-22.
33. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 383.
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B. An Example
Let us consider a very simple situation. Suppose that there
are four possible levels of care (including zero) that a potential
injurer can adopt. The injury is one in which the victim suffers
some loss. The probabilities of injury and the costs of care are
given in Table 7.
Table 7
Units of Care

Cost of Care

Probability of Injury

0

0

.06

1

15

.03

2

30

.01

3

45

0

Let us suppose that the level of care that is socially
optimal is 2 units and that the optimal-deterrence damages are
$1000. These two assumptions are consistent since $1000
damages will induce the potential injurer to adopt 2 units of
care. This can be seen in Table 8.34

34. Anything between $750 and $1500, noninclusive, would do. However,
I chose $1000 because it is also optimal if we allow fractional levels of care.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/5
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Table 8
Units of
Care

Cost of Care

Probability
of Injury

Expected
Liability

Expected
Private Cost

0

0

.06

60

60

1

15

.03

30

45

2

30

.01

10

40

3

45

0

0

45

Let us also assume that the level of optimal damages from
an insurance standpoint is $600. Thus, the ideal outcome
would be for the potential injurer to adopt 2 units of care and
for the potential victim to receive $600 every time an injury
occurs. Unfortunately, a simple damage rule of $600 will not
provide the proper deterrence. With damages of $600 the
private payoffs are given in Table 9.
Table 9
Units of
Care

Cost of Care

Probability
of Injury

Expected
Liability

Expected
Private Cost

0

0

.06

36

36

1

15

.03

18

33

2

30

.01

6

36

3

45

0

0

45

Thus, with damages of $600 the potential injurer will
adopt 1 unit of care. The probability of an accident will be 3
times higher than the optimal level (that is, .03 rather than
.01).
A market for unmatured tort claims allows potential
victims to sell their claims. For example, a potential injurer
could sell an unmatured claim to a third party for $10. Such a
claim would give the holder a right to bring an action for

15
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optimal-deterrence damages against the tortfeasor. That is, the
third party would bring an action against the potential injurer
for $1000 whenever there was an injury. This would give the
potential tortfeasor the incentive to adopt 2 units of care; the
optimum and the resultant probability of an accident would be
.01. The potential victim could then buy $600 worth of
insurance for $6 and would pocket the remaining $4. Both the
third party and the insurer break-even since the probability of
an accident will be .01 under these conditions, resulting in both
optimal deterrence and optimal insurance.
In Cooter’s proposal, however, the potential injurer will
also be able to bid for the unmatured tort claim.35 In this case,
there would be the additional advantage of transaction costs
savings since the potential injurer would not sue himself or
herself. Unfortunately, the entry of the potential injurer into
the market for unmatured tort claims will destroy the market
and also destroy the incentives for optimal care. To see why
this result comes about we must look at pricing.
C. Parties to the Transaction
There are three different types of parties: the potential
victims, the potential injurer, and the potential third party
purchasers.36 The potential victim sells the tort claim.37
Potential buyers include the potential injurer and potential
third party purchasers.38
D. Pricing
We begin our discussion by inquiring how much a potential
third party purchaser would be willing to pay for an
unmatured tort claim. The potential third-party purchaser
realizes that if the claim is purchased and enforced, the
potential injurer will have an incentive to adopt two units of

35.
36.
37.
38.

See Cooter, supra note 1, at 383-84.
See id. at 384-85.
See id.
See id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/5
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care.39 The probability of injury will then be .01 yielding an
expected liability of $10. Thus, the most a potential third party
purchaser will be willing to pay is $10.
How much will the potential injurer be willing to pay? The
potential injurer would think of the calculation in the following
terms, “If I purchase the claim and adopt zero units of care,
then my costs are just the price of the claim, since I will not sue
myself. If I do not purchase the claim, then I have private costs
of $40.” (See Table 8.) Thus, the potential injurer is willing to
pay up to $40 for the claim.40
Suppose that the potential injurer makes a bid of $11,
wins, and adopts zero units of care in 2015. Now, assume that
potential third party purchasers observe that in 2015 the
accident rate is 6%, and they reason that if they had the claim
it would be worth $60, that is $1000 times .06. Based on this
reasoning, on January 1, 2016, a potential third party
purchaser bids $50 and wins the claim. The potential injurer
immediately adjusts for this liability exposure and adopts two
units of care. In 2016, the third party purchaser collects only
$10. Of course, it is unlikely that a sophisticated third party
purchaser would make such a mistake, but surely it would not
do so twice. The following year the potential injurer again bids
$11 and is uncontested.
The results are that (1) only potential tortfeasors will be in
the market for their own unmatured tort claims and (2) the
potential injurer will adopt a suboptimal level of care.
E. Insurance
Under some arrangements, the presence of insurance can
mitigate the incentive problem, but cannot solve it. Let us look
at pricing in this case.
In order to see the effects of insurance, let us start with a
simple example. Suppose that the purchaser of the unmatured
tort claim is required to provide the optimal level of insurance,
in this case $600, to the potential victim. Let us call this a
bundled claim. In this case, the third party purchaser would
39. See id. at 385.
40. See supra Table 9, for the referenced calculation.
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have the right to collect $1000 from the potential injurer
whenever there was an accident but it would have to pay $600
to the victim. Thus, the third party purchaser would collect
$400 for every accident. Under such circumstances, the third
party purchaser knows that the potential injurer will have the
incentive to adopt two units of care. Thus, the probability of an
accident would be .01 and the claim would be worth $4 to the
purchaser.
Suppose that the potential injurer also offers to buy a
bundled claim. With the bundled claim, the potential injurer
must pay $600 whenever there is an accident. The potential
injurer will thus adopt one unit of care. (See Table 9.) The cost
to the potential injurer will be $33. Without the tort claim, the
potential injurer will face $1000 in liability per accident and
will adopt two units of care. The cost will be $40. Thus, the
potential injurer will be willing to pay up to $7 for the bundled
claim.
The third-party purchaser is willing to pay up to $4 for this
bundled claim. The potential injurer is willing to pay up to $7.
Suppose that the potential injurer makes a bid of $5, wins, and
adopts one unit of care in 2015. Now suppose that potential
third-party purchasers observe that in 2015 the accident rate is
3%. Suppose they reason that if they had the claim they would
have collected $12, that is $400 times .03. Based on this
reasoning, on January 1, 2016, a potential third-party
purchaser bids $8 and wins the claim. The potential injurer
immediately adjusts for this liability exposure and adopts two
units of care. In 2016, the third-party purchaser collects only
$4. Again, it is unlikely that a sophisticated third-party
purchaser would make the mistake of bidding over $4, but
surely it would not do so twice. The next year the potential
injurer again bids $5 and is uncontested. The potential injurer
adopts one unit of care. This is suboptimal.
F.

Exacerbating Considerations

In addition to the above advantages (due to moral hazard),
the tortfeasor has additional advantages in terms of
transaction costs and information. That is, the tortfeasor saves
on considerable transaction costs of post-accident bargaining,
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settlement and trial.41 Furthermore, the potential tortfeasor
has information on precautionary technology and accident
rates that are unavailable to others in the secondary market.
In some senses, avoiding transaction costs is socially good, so
long as doing so does not have other adverse consequences. In
the case of unmatured tort claims, these advantages help to
drive non-potential tortfeasors from the market and result in
poor incentives for care. One additional effect of the possible
asymmetry of information is that outside bidders would suffer
from winner’s curse problems42. This makes it even less likely
that a secondary market will develop.
Finally, if we add strategic behavior to our model, the
possibility exists for extremely low pricing and no secondary
market. That is, the potential tortfeasor may offer to buy the
unmatured tort claim at an extremely low price with an
additional conditional offer to beat any competitors offer by,
say, 10 percent. Given the transaction costs that are entailed in
valuing an unmatured tort claim, the incentives of any
secondary buyer to conduct such a valuation disappear in the
face of such an offer. Thus, the price that a potential tortfeasor
will be able to set will be limited only by the information and
bargaining power of the sellers. Neither information nor
bargaining power of sellers (for example, of employees) are
likely to be great. The result is that potential tortfeasors would
be seriously underdeterred.
G. Excluding Potential Tortfeasors
The above discussion indicates that the unmatured tort
claim will end up in the hands of the potential injurer and that
the potential injurer will adopt a suboptimal level of care. It
also indicates that no active market will ever develop.

41. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 407.
42. The winner's curse refers to the phenomenon in which bidders are
uncertain about the true value of the "item" put up for bid. In such a case, the
winner of the auction is likely to be a bidder that has overestimated. Thus, by
winning, the winner loses. Experienced bidders compensate for the winner's
curse by lowering their bids. See WILLIAM SAMUELSON & STEPHEN MARKS,
MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS, SEVENTH EDITION (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011),
for a discussion of the winner’s curse.
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Nevertheless, a market for unmatured tort claims can
accomplish its goal of optimal insurance and optimal
deterrence if potential injurers are excluded from the market:
Modification 2: Potential tortfeasors should not
be able to purchase unmatured tort claims from
their potential victims.
In such a case, the tort claim will end up in the hands of
third-party purchasers who will enforce the claims against
potential injurers.43 Accordingly, potential injurers will adopt
the optimal level of care and potential victims will be able to
obtain optimal insurance.44 In short, in order for a market in
unmatured tort claims to accomplish its twin goals of optimal
insurance and optimal deterrence, potential tortfeasors must
not be allowed to purchase the claims of their potential
victims.45
V. Liability-Limiting Agreements
The next issue involves liability-limiting agreements
between the holders of the claims and the potential tortfeasors.
Consider the case of an insurance company that provides
insurance to the employees and that has purchased the claims
(as part of an insurance package) from employees. It should be
clear from the above discussion that the employer could afford
to pay the insurer a fee not to enforce the full extent of the
claims. For example, the employer could offer the insurance
company a fee in exchange for limiting the damages to $600. In
this case, the employer could reduce caution to one unit. The
maximum fee that the employer could offer for this is $7 since
this is the amount it would save. Such an agreement would cost
the insurer $4. This is calculated as follows. The insurance
43. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 395.
44. See id. at 399.
45. Those who believe that the tort law has developed along efficient
lines will be encouraged by the consistency of the above reasoning with
developments in the early nineteenth century when courts invalidated
waivers of liability as against public policy. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 386
n.7, for examples of such cases.
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company would collect more damages since it would be
collecting $18 (3% of $600) rather than $10 (1% of $1000) for a
gain of $8. However, it would also be paying out $18 (3% of
$600) rather than $6 (1% of $600) for a loss of $12. On net, it
loses $4 so it will require a fee of at least $4. Thus, a mutually
advantageous deal could be struck. The fee would be greater
than $4 and lower than $7. The potential injurer would adopt
one unit of care.
In short, if we allow liability-limiting agreements between
holders of claims and the potential tortfeasor, we would get
similar results to those that we would get by letting potential
tortfeasors in the market. In particular, we would get
insufficient incentives for care. Hence, our last modification:
Modification 3: Potential tortfeasors should not
be able to enter into liability-limiting agreements
with the holders of unmatured tort claims.
With these three modifications, the market for unmatured
tort claims could produce optimal deterrence and optimal
insurance.
VI. Conclusions
The above discussion in no way strikes at the heart of the
argument for a market in unmatured tort claims. Rather, it
suggests that, in order to accomplish its goals, three
modifications are necessary. First, the claims must be based on
optimal-deterrence damages rather than full-compensation
damages. Second, potential tortfeasors must not be allowed to
purchase the claims of their potential victims. Third,
agreements between potential tortfeasors and the holders of
unmatured tort claims must be prohibited.
Of course, this will not end debate on this issue. The
market for unmatured tort claims, as modified, will accomplish
the goal of optimal deterrence and optimal insurance only if we
determine the size of optimal deterrence awards. There have
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been some attempts to do this46, but the discussion must
continue. Furthermore, while the modified market for
unmatured tort claims can produce both optimal deterrence
and optimal insurance, it does not eliminate transaction costs
of the tort system. Thus, it must be compared to, or considered
in conjunction with, proposals that might mitigate transaction
costs. Nevertheless, it is time to give the market for unmatured
tort claims another look.

46. See Danzon, supra note 19, at 517.
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Technical Appendix
Over-deterrence
In this section, Cooter’s model of a wealth-neutral accident
is used to demonstrate mathematically the problem of overdeterrence.47 The problem of over-deterrence can be seen using
the model that Cooter provided. Suppose that a consumer
purchases a good for a price of s and that the good produces a
utility of U(w-s), where w means wealth, if it causes no injury
and V(w-s) if it injures the consumer. The probability of injury
is p. The consumer has an expected utility equal to:
(1-p)U(w-s) + pV(w-s).
First, as an aside, let us replicate Cooter’s argument that
full compensation overcompensates.48 To do this, we allow the
consumer to purchase perfectly fair insurance.
(1-p)U(w-s-pA) + pV(w-s-pA+A).
A is the amount of insurance purchased and pA is the
premium. Now suppose that V = U-k. That is, the accident
shifts the utility function downward. This is Cooter’s wealthneutral accident. The above expression becomes:
(1-p)U(w-s -pA) + pU(w-s-pA+A) - pk

(1)

If we maximize this expression over A, to determine the
amount of insurance that the consumer will choose, and if we
simplify, we get the following first order expression:
U’(w-s-pA) = U’(w-s-pA+A)
which is fulfilled only if A is zero. That is, the consumer will
choose not to insure. As Cooter points out, in this case, the
potential victim will not want to insure since marginal utility is
47. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 388-91.
48. See id. at 384.

23

208

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:1

unaffected by the accident even though total utility falls.49 In
this case, any compensation is overcompensation.50
I will show that in this type of wealth-neutral accident, full
compensation also produces over-deterrence. First note that if
A=0 then expression (1) becomes:
U(w-s) - pk.
The producer produces the good. For simplicity, suppose
that the only expense in producing the good is care, c. The
probability of an accident is a function of the level of care, c.
The probability decreases as c increases, but at a decreasing
rate. (We say that p’ is negative and p” is positive.) Suppose
that the producer is in perfect competition and that there is
Coasian51 bargaining. In this case, profits will be bid to zero,
that is, c=s. Furthermore, utility will be maximized. That is, we
maximize the following expression:
U(w-c) - p(c)k.
Notice that in perfect competition the consumer will pay a
price of s=c. Thus, the consumer balances price and safety. The
optimal c is chosen so that the first order condition is zero:
U’(w-c*) + p’(c*)k = 0.
Now let us remove the assumption of Coasian52 bargaining
and replace it with a damage rule that requires the producer to
pay damages of d whenever there is an accident. Let us make
this a full compensation rule53 so that
U(w-c*+d) - k = U(w-c*)

49. See id. at 392.
50. See Cooter, supra note 1, for an especially clear explanation of this.
51. See Nancy A. Weston, The Metaphysics of Modern Tort Theory, 28
VAL. U. L. REV. 919, 926 (1994).
52. See id.
53. See supra Section II (defining full-compensation damages).
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which is to say that utilities in the accident state and nonaccident state are equated. Dividing through by d and
rearranging a bit we get the equality in the following
expression:
{U(w-c*+d) - U(w-c*)}/d = k/d < U’(w-c*).
The inequality comes from the fact that the expression to
the left of the equality is the slope of a line connecting w-c* and
w-c*+d on the utility function and U’(w-c*) is the slope of the
tangent at w-c*. Because of risk aversion, the utility function is
concave and the tangent has a greater slope. If we substitute
k/d into expression (1) above we get:
k/d + p’(c*)k < 0 or, equivalently
1 + p’(c*)d < 0.
Note that the producer will want to maximize profit s-cp(c)d. (Remember that s is fixed by market since the firm is a
price-taker.) The producer will choose a c** so that the first
order condition is satisfied:
1 + p’(c**)d = 0.
Finally, recall that p’ is negative but becomes less negative
as c increases due to diminishing marginal returns. (That is, p”
is positive.) This implies that the expression 1+p’(c)d is
increasing in c and that c** is greater than c*. Thus, the
producer is over-deterred.
The Market for Unmatured Tort Claims54
Consider an employer who must pay for safety. Cost of
safety is c. The probability of an accident p(c) where p falls with
c, but at a decreasing rate due to diminishing marginal returns
to safety. If an accident happens D is paid, where D is the
optimal deterrence level of damages. (I am assuming that we
54. See generally Cooter, supra note 1.
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have made the modification suggested in the previous section.)
The optimal level of care is, by definition, the amount that
minimizes:
c + p(c)D.
The value that minimizes the above expression, that is, the
optimal level of care, is cd. In the following examples we
assume that the secondary market for unmatured tort claims is
unrestricted. That is, potential tortfeasors can buy the claims
of their potential victims.
First, for simplicity, consider the case where there is no
insurance. There are two possibilities. Either the employer
purchases the unmatured tort claims and the employers costs
are c + t, where t is purchase price of the claims, or, others
purchase the claims and enforce them in court. In this case, the
expected costs to the potential injurer are c + p(c)D. In the first
case, the employer has no liability and no incentive to adopt
care and sets c to zero. In the second case, c is set to cd. In
other words, the action of the employer is conditional whether
the employer wins the bid. This is true even if the rights must
be purchased yearly.
How much will the employer be willing to pay for the
rights? To find the answer we subtract the cost with the rights,
t, from the cost without the rights cd + p(cd)D. The difference is
cd + p(cd)D - t.
The employer is willing to pay up to cd + p(cd)D for the
rights. Suppose that the employer has a standing offer to
purchase the rights for [0.5cd + p(cd)D]. Since the rights are
only worth p(cd)D to an outsider, the employer will always win
the bid. The employer will also adopt zero level of care. Again,
note that the rights will not be worth p(0)D to an outsider
because as soon as an outsider wins the bid, the employer will
optimize by adopting cd. This dramatic example shows that not
only will a secondary market not develop, but also that the
effects on care level could be drastic in terms of deterrence.
Does insurance fix this? Suppose the employer provides
insurance to all employees. In the case of an accident the
insurance pays I. I is less than D reflecting the notion that
optimal insurance is less than optimal deterrence damages.
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Now we have the following costs:
ci + p(ci)I + t
if the employer buys the rights, and
cx + p(cx)I + p(cx)D if someone else buys the rights.
We have chosen ci to minimize c + p(c)I and cx to
minimize c + p(c)I + p(c)D. In neither case does the employer
adopt cd. Furthermore, we can again show that a secondary
market will not develop. The difference between the two
expressions is:
{[cx + p(cx)I] - [ci + p(ci)I]} + p(cx)D - t.
The expression in the brackets {} is positive since ci
minimizes c + p(c)I. Again, we can imagine a standing offer by
the employer of, say,
0.5{[cx + p(cx)I] - [ci + p(ci)I]} + p(cx)D.
Given this offer, the employer would always win the bid,
since it is worth at most p(cx)D to an outsider. Furthermore,
the employer would end up adopting a level of care equal to ci,
which is less than the optimal level of care, cd. (Once the
employer has the rights, the cost of buying the rights is a fixed
cost. That is true even if annual purchase is required.) Thus,
again, the optimal deterrence level of care cd would not be
adopted. Furthermore, no secondary market would ever
develop.
Other arrangements also lead to similar results. Suppose
that potential victims have no insurance and buyers compete
by promising insurance plus a lump sum. Persons in the
secondary market could afford to bid a lump sum up to:
Ls = p(cd)D - p(cd)I.
The employer could bid a lump sum representing the
differences in costs between obtaining the rights and not,
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Lt = [cd + p(cd)D] - [ci + p(ci)I].
Note that
Lt - Ls = [cd + p(cd)D] - [ci + p(ci)I] - [p(cd)D - p(cd)I]
= [cd + p(cd)I] - [ci + p(ci)I].
The above expression is positive since ci minimizes c +
p(c)I. Thus, the employer could adopt a standing offer of:
Ls + 0.5{[cd + p(cd)I] - [ci + p(ci)I]}.
Given this offer, the employer would always win the bid.
Furthermore, the employer would end up adopting a level of
care equal to ci, which is less than cd. (Again, once the
employer has the rights, the cost of buying the rights is a fixed
cost, which is true even if annual purchase is required.) Thus,
the optimal deterrence level of care cd would not be adopted.
Furthermore, no secondary market would ever develop.
It is not necessary that the same outside entity both buys
the claims and provides the insurance although there are
reasons not included in the model to believe that this will
happen. For example, if we consider the optimal level of
resources spent in enforcing the claim the reasoning would be
as follows. Suppose that there are two entities; A provides
insurance for employees and B has purchased the unmatured
claims from the employees. Suppose B spends z amount in
enforcing the claims and that this affects the probability of an
accident. Now suppose that there is a merger between A and B.
The optimal amount spent enforcing the claims goes up since
the marginal benefits of enforcing claims and reducing the
probability of an accident increases. Although we have not
made the argument in a formal mathematical sense, the
reasoning indicates that it is likely that the firm providing
insurance will also purchase the unmatured tort claims.
Liability-Limiting Agreements
Consider the case of an insurance company that provides

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/5

28

2014] THE MARKET IN UNMATURED TORT CLAIMS

213

insurance to the employees and that has purchased the claims
(as part of an insurance package) from employees. It should be
clear from the above discussion that the employer could afford
to pay the insurer a fee not to enforce the full extent of the
claims. For example, the employer could offer the insurance
company a fee not to make any claims. In this case, the
employer could reduce caution to zero. The maximum fee that
the employer could offer for this is therefore:
cd + p(cd)D.(3)
The minimum fee that the insurance company would be
willing to accept is the loss of revenue due to suit, plus the
increased cost of insuring the employees, given that the
employer will now adopt zero caution:
p(cd)D + [p(0)I - p(cd)I].(4)
If we subtract expression (4) from expression (3) we will
get the size of the zone of potential agreement:
[cd + p(cd)D] - [p(cd)D + p(0)I - p(cd)I].
The question is whether the resulting expression is
positive. If it is positive then some agreement is possible. We
can rewrite it as follows:
cd + p(cd)I - [0 + p(0)I].
Whether this is positive depends on the function c + p(c)I.
This function is minimized at ci, which is greater than zero, but
less than cd. We cannot tell whether the above expression is
positive or negative. There does, however, exist the possibility
that it is positive and, therefore, it is possible that an
agreement could lead to the adoption of zero care.
Other agreements are also possible. For example, to find
the most beneficial agreement to both parties, but not
necessarily to the employees, we note that they could agree
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that the insurance company limits its damages to X. Then, the
benefit of the agreement to the employer over no agreement
would be
[cd + p(cd)D] - [cx + p(cx)X] - F.
Where cx minimizes c + p(c)X, and F is the agreed upon
fee, then the benefit to the insurer would be
F - [p(cd)D - p(cx)X] - [p(cx)I - p(cd)I].
The expression in the first bracket represents lost
collections from the employer and the second bracket
represents increased payouts to the employees. Adding these
benefits together, and simplifying the expression, yields:
[cd + p(cd)I] - [cx + p(cx)I]
Note that X has disappeared from the expression.
However, it is X that determines cx since cx is the c that
minimizes c + p(c)X. The cx that minimizes expression (5) is
just ci, since ci minimizes c +p(c)I therefore it follows that X=I.
That is the maximum bargaining surplus generated by the
insurance company, limiting its claim to I. In this case, the
employer will adopt a level of care equal to ci. Given this, the
maximum fee that the employer will pay for such a limitation
is:
[cd + p(cd)D] - [ci + p(ci) I],
and the minimum fee that the employer will accept is:
[p(cd)D - p(ci)I] + [p(ci)I - p(cd)I].
The bargaining surplus is the difference, which is, after
simplification:
[cd + p(cd)I] - [ci + p(ci)I].
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This is always positive since ci minimizes ci + p(ci)I. The
result is that there are strong incentives for a deal to be struck
and for the level of care to be set at ci. That is, the employer
will be underdeterred. Thus, we would not allow such deals to
be made.
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